Is Mateship a Virtue? by Page, James S.
Page, James S. (2002). ‘Is Mateship a Virtue?’ Australian Journal of Social Issues. 
37(2): 193-200. 
Copyright 2002 Australian Council of Social Services 
IS MATESHIP A VIRTUE? 
James Smith Page 
Abstract 
This essay seeks to examine the concept of mateship from the perspectives of 
consequentialist and virtue ethics. It is suggested that mateship is a prominent concept 
in the way Australians think of themselves. However it is also suggested that mateship 
is linked to solidarity and commitment in time of war. It is suggested that what we 
should recognize mateship is one of the factors that facilitates and perpetuates war. It 
is suggested that mateship is also questionable as a character virtue, given what 
mateship entails. It is suggested that ultimately we need to examine more closely the 
consequences of the solidarity that we define as mateship, and we need to query more 
closely what we regard as virtues. 
Article  
The phenomenon of mateship is often claimed within public discourse to be a 
defining characteristic of what it means to be Australian. Recently there was a 
suggestion that there be a specific reference within the Australian Constitution to the 
value of mateship for Australians (Howard 1999). One could even suggest that 
mateship is beginning to take on the status of a national ideology, that is, something a 
nation believes to be a defining characteristic. Mateship has often been identified as 
one of the traditional qualities of the Australian bushman, in supporting others in time 
of adversity. The writing of Henry Lawson did much to cement the concept of 
mateship within the self-consciousness of Australia. For Lawson, mateship was 
undeniably a mark of personal nobility, ironically most often displayed by the 
marginalized underclass of Australian society. 
The importance of the concept of mateship within the work of Henry Lawson is 
interesting, given the influence of his work in forming Australian culture. In 
numerous stories and poems, Lawson extols the virtue of the person who, in the midst 
of adversity, is prepared to stand with a comrade and provide help. Indeed, Lawson’s 
understanding of mateship might be described almost exclusively in terms [193/194 
page break] of helping another in adversity, and it is to him a particularly Australian 
quality. Lawson once described Australia as ‘the Great Lone Land of magnificent 
distances and bright heat; the land of Self-reliance, and Never-give-in, and Help-your-
mate” (1974: 16). It is perhaps not a coincidence that the poet who prompted the 
suggestion that the reference to mateship be included within the Constitution (Les 
Murray) identifies himself very much as a bush poet. Just as Australians like to 
identify’ themselves with the bush, so too Australians have long sought to identify 
themselves with the ideal of mateship.  
However, it is in the adversity and experience of war, and particularly the experience 
of World War One, that the qualities of mateship supposedly developed, and there is a 
strong case that the concept now carries unavoidable martial connotations. It is rare 
that there is any public commentary on the ANZAC experience without a concomitant 
reference to the value of mateship. This is especially so on official days of war 
commemoration in Australia, which, with the passing of time, seem to be becoming 
more rather than less important within Australian society. Within the public discourse 
surrounding the concept, mateship is assumed to be a desirable defining quality that 
individuals should aspire to. Yet there seems to be little critical examination of 
whether mateship is in fact something desirable, on whether mateship should be 
considered a virtue. It seems appropriate that we should attempt at least some critical 
analysis of the concept of mateship, and in this essay I attempt to undertake such a 
critical analysis from the perspectives of consequentialist ethics and virtue ethics.  
What do we now mean by mateship? Mateship most simply can be thought of as 
fraternity. There is also a range of accompanying characteristics of mateship. 
Mateship involves a state of being. Mateship involves action or at least a willingness 
to be committed to action. A mate is someone who things with and for certain others 
(mates) or is prepared to do things with and for certain others (mates). Additionally, 
mateship involves an affective element of solidarity. Mateship implies a certain bond 
or feeling of oneness which is felt with and for others. At the same time there is also a 
crucial yet often ignored dimension to mateship. Mateship is limited to those with 
whom one has a special connection. This special connection may be technically one 
of occupation, although increasingly the exclusive connection is a national-military 
one. We might refer to workmates as such. However it is difficult to examine a sense 
in which mateship as a concept could be applied to the workplace. Mateship is a 
concept, which, in current usage, ineluctably connotes solidarity in time of combat. 
The contemporary military connotation of the concept assists in demonstrating the 
exclusive nature of the concept of mateship. In time of war one does not think of the 
enemy as being mates. Similarly one does not think of citizens of another country 
[194/195] as being mates. It would be doubtful if employees at another workplace 
would be thought of as mates. We can think of fellow players in a game of contact 
sport as being mates, although it would be doubtful if we would refer to players on an 
opposing team as being mates. Mateship may be an inclusive concept, in that certain 
persons are defined as being members of a group. However mateship also has quite 
exclusionary characteristics, in that the group-sentiment which mateship serves to 
support only assists in defining others as outside that scope of the group.  
It would be wrong not to mention that one of the obvious exclusionary characteristics 
of the concept is that women tend not to be included in most understandings of 
mateship and what it means to be a mate. Mateship is a particularly male-oriented 
concept. Thus when we seek to define mateship it is appropriate for us to do so in 
terms of fraternity rather than sorority. It is often said that whilst men have mates, 
women have friends. It is interesting to speculate whether this will change, especially 
as women become increasingly involved in all aspects of social and economic life. 
Sadly, the key aspect of whether the concepts of mate and mateship remain male 
concepts as such will probably depend on the future involvement of women in combat 
roles within the military in Australia. Of course, one could well argue that even if 
there is a lexical change, in that mateship does include women, nevertheless the 
cultural understanding of mateship is still a male-dominated one. The values of 
mateship are arguably male values, and the extension of mateship to include women 
can be seen within the context of the virilization of contemporary society. In simple 
terms, it may be that in the future mateship is considered to include women, although 
this will probably be because women have been actively involved in the male 
practices of war and warfare.  
Should mateship be considered a virtue? It is not within the scope of this essay to 
develop any detailed exposition of virtue ethics or of consequentialist ethics. However, 
in fundamental terms it can be said that within moral philosophy there are two 
sciences: the science of virtue, or aretaics, and the science of happiness, or 
eudaemonics. Virtue is defined here to denote a desirable character trait or moral 
quality, while happiness is defined as denoting a relative absence of human suffering. 
In simple terms it can be said that we do things because to undertake such actions is 
inherently worthwhile (roughly speaking, virtue ethics) or we do things because of 
worthwhile consequences (roughly speaking, consequentialist ethics). Virtue ethics is 
also sometimes called agent-based ethics, in that the focus is on the moral integrity or 
character of the doer of the action. Eudaemonics is related to consequentialist ethics, 
as the focus is on what happens as a consequence of the actions. Technically, when 
we ask whether mateship is a virtue, we should only be focusing on virtue ethics. 
However for the purposes of this essay I take the question to mean both whether 
mateship is inherently worthwhile and whether mateship has worthwhile 
consequences. [195/196]  
Consequentialist ethics (sometimes inaccurately referred to as utilitarian ethics) can 
be considered very much a pre-eminent modern ethical theory. The vocabulary of 
consequentialism seems to be of recent origin (see, for example, Anscombe 1958). 
Nonetheless the view that ethics is concerned with making the world a better place for 
all is one which has a long history, and is also one that resonates very much with the 
rise of democratic theory in the modern world. The dictum of Jeremy Bentham, that 
morality should be concerned with the greatest good for the greatest number, perhaps 
expresses the democratic appeal of what most philosophers now know as 
consequentialism. The view that we should measure the ethical value of actions and 
attitudes by the results that such actions and attitudes produce is very much contingent 
upon an organized (modern) society which can measure and analyse the results of 
actions and attitudes. Another way of expressing this is through the concept of 
outcomes. The concern with outcomes, a concern with seems to dominate so many 
areas of social and economic life, very much reflects the unspoken dominance of 
consequentialist ethics within so many areas of modern life.  
Virtue ethics has a long history, resting most famously on the work of Aristotle in 
Nicomachean Ethics, wherein one finds not only a definition of a virtue as an 
excellence of character and also a schematization of differing virtues or aspects of 
virtues, Indeed for most of the history of ethics, ethics was automatically assumed to 
mean virtue ethics. In other words, the value of actions and attitudes was to be 
assessed through the aspects of character this revealed about the doer of the actions. 
In recent decades virtue ethics has been undergoing something of a renascence, 
commencing with the work of Anscombe (1958). There has been a resurgence of 
interest in virtue ethics and education (Carr and Stuetal 1999). Perhaps what is most 
interesting, however, is the way that virtue ethics or systems relating to virtue ethics 
seem to be impacting upon popular literature and popular culture (Bellah 1986, 
Dorwick 1997, Hinkley 2000, and Kavelin-Popov 1997). The bumper sticker 
exhorting us to ‘practice random acts of kindness and senseless acts of beauty’ 
reflects what might be called a virtue ethics sentiment. If the actions are random and 
senseless, then the action clearly cannot be based upon any rule or consequences. 
There must be something inherently good in such practices; that is, such practices 
represent an excellence or virtue of human character.  
Should mateship then be considered a virtue? The assumed answer to the above 
question within public discourse is overwhelmingly affirmative. The term is used with 
a connotation of strong approval, especially within Australian military history. 
However, from the standpoints of both consequentialist and virtue ethics, I believe the 
answer must be no. [196/197]  
From a consequentialist ethics perspective, one must say that the solidarity and 
commitment that we encapsulate within the concept of mateship is one central factor 
that facilitates and perpetuates the phenomenon of war. There are two ways in which 
this happens. One is that mateship establishes a sense of the enemy as the Other, that 
is, someone who is, definitively, not a mate. It is the de-humanizing notion of human 
beings as enemy which allows individuals to participate in killing - something in 
which such individuals otherwise would not participate. The second way that 
mateship facilitates the phenomenon of war is that mateship enables individuals to 
endure the unendurable in war, and thus ultimately to keep the killing process 
continuing. Normally it is asserted that mateship is something, which has developed 
out of the experience of war. However the reverse proposition might be more accurate. 
Perhaps war has developed out of mateship.  
One illustration of this nexus is to be found in the course of World War One, an 
appropriate historical illustration, given that it is in reference to the Australian 
involvement in the war that the rhetoric of mateship is so often used. One might 
suggest that the war came to an end in 1918 precisely because the mateship (or 
solidarity) of the Germans broke down, under a combination of military reverses, 
hunger and war weariness. Such a breakdown might be perceived at surface level to 
indicate something of a failure of character. After all, the Allies had persevered under 
the testing and trying circumstances of trench warfare for the past four years. 
However the fact that we are tempted to see lack of resolve in war as something of a 
character weakness is in itself instructive. Put simply, without mateship the war and 
the killing could not have continued for four years from 1914 to 1918. One could state 
the point even more forcefully and suggest that without mateship the process of 
killing could not have commenced.  
Exactly what kept the 1914-1918 conflict continuing so long is one of the questions 
that concerned Niall Ferguson in his book The Pity of War. Ferguson suggests a 
range of factors, including, interestingly, the common practice of shooting prisoners 
and the prospects of being shot if one surrendered. However one of the other factors 
which Ferguson identifies is comradeship, the ‘cement’ (446) that held things together 
within the trenches. For Ferguson, a sense of loyalty and commitment to one’s fellow 
soldiers was even more powerful a motivating force for fighting and continuing to 
fight than patriotism. Patriotism, although obviously cultivated by political leaders 
tended to be regarded with some cynicism by the common soldier. By way of contrast, 
loyalty and commitment to one’s fellow soldiers had a powerful emotional appeal, 
made all the stronger by the terrors and daily threat of death that men experienced 
together. [197/198] 
It is easy to empathize with this. After all, most Australians will never be forced to 
experience the terrors of combat, It is arguable therefore that we should be 
sympathetic to any coping mechanism that allowed soldiers to survive the ordeal of 
war. However, the point is that by eulogizing mateship we are in a sense legitimizing 
or reinforcing the institution that mateship so strongly undergirded modern organized 
warfare. If it is true that mateship (or comradeship) facilitates modern war, then 
perhaps we should be more critical about such concepts, and certainly less eager to 
eulogize and commemorate them.  
Further, a close examination of mateship from the perspective of virtue ethics also 
raises some serious questions. Is it such a desirable moral or character trait that an 
individual should feel solidarity with comrades in the process of killing others? The 
idea that human beings are not socially or physiologically suited for killing other 
human beings is an idea dating back to Renaissance Humanism (Erasmus, 1974). It is 
also an idea which has received renewed emphasis in recent biological research 
(Seville Group, 1986). Humans have no natural external body armour and neither is 
there any part of the body which can naturally and of itself be used as a weapon. It is 
difficult to see how solidarity and participation in the process of killing other human 
beings could lead or enhance the inner harmony of the individual, as in the Platonic 
view of ethics. Equally, from the perspective of Aristotelian ethics, it is difficult to see 
how solidarity and participation in the process of killing could be considered an 
inherently desirable action or state of affairs.  
It is because solidarity and participation in the process of killing is so inhumane that 
the process is also so dehumanizing to those involved in the process. The process is 
destructive of character and debilitative of creativity. Often this reveals itself in what 
was previously known as war-neurosis, although now more obliquely known as post-
traumatic stress disorder. The destructive effects .of killing can be perhaps most 
clearly seen in societies committed to such processes, such as various totalitarian 
states in which sociopathic individuals have gained control of the apparatus of the 
state. However, even within democratic societies, the destructive results of 
involvement in killing other human beings is now well researched (Grossman 1995 
and 2000, Marshall 2000). In some ways the process of emphasizing military 
solidarity can be seen a coping mechanism for dealing with the difficulties of killing. 
The coping mechanism is understandable. However it seems wrong to argue that the 
idea of solidarity or mateship in itself should be celebrated as some kind of natural 
virtue. The ultimate paradox of mateship is that it is precisely the unvirtuous nature of 
the activity which it undergirds that provides the social impetus to describe mateship 
as a virtue. The process of the ideologization and validation of war experience, 
processes encapsulated in the concept of mateship are ultimately processes of denial 
of the reality of the past, and processes of attempting to live within that denial. 
[198/199] 
What we can gain from an analysis of rhetoric of mateship is an understanding of how 
military concerns underlie much public discourse within Australia. In many ways the 
validation of military endeavour is an extremely important task for those involved 
public discourse in Australia. From a perspective of consequentialist ethics we need to 
query more closely the effects of the solidarity which we understand as mateship. 
Perhaps too the analysis of the concept of mateship from a virtue ethics perspective 
reveals that we need a more qualified virtue ethics, one that questions the purpose and 
nature of what we regard as virtuous. 
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